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One Is the Loneliest Number:
The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return World
LILY KAHNG*
The United States is one of the few developed countries to retain the joint income tax
return, available for heterosexual married couples only. Since its adoption in 1948, its
underlying assumptions have been challenged on many valid grounds, and yet it
remains firmly embedded in mainstreampolitical and policy discourse. In recent years,
most of the debate surrounding the joint return has focused on reducing marriage
penalties, bonuses, and determining who among the universe of couples ought to be
extended the benefit of the marriage bonuses. The treatment of single people has
received almost no attention.
The scant attention paid to single people is striking in light of the most recent U.S.
census data, which indicate that they are nearing a majority of the adult population, a
trend one demographer describes as a "clear tipping point." Moreover, awareness of
singles as an overlooked demographic is starting to permeate the political and popular
cultural consciousness. In addition, economists and other behavioral scientists, as well
as feminist theorists, have begun to study singleness as a social identity. They have
begun to gather persuasive evidence of the costs-economic, social, and
psychological-that are imposed on single people, and to chart the development of a
more vibrant social identity for single people.
This Article draws upon the research and insight from these other disciplines to assess
the negative impact of the joint return on single people, and to challenge the
fundamental assumptions underlying the joint return. It concludes that single people
are unduly penalized under the joint return, and that it ought to be abolished.

* Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law. I am grateful to Mary Louise Fellows,
Wendy Gerzog, Anthony Infanti, John Kirkwood, Leo Martinez, Lawrence Zelenak, and the
participants of the 2009 Critical Tax Conference at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law for
their helpful comments. I also thank Seattle University law librarian Kelly Kunsch and research
assistants James Beebe and Thomas Chang.
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INTRODUCTION

The United States is one of the few developed countries to retain
the joint return, available for heterosexual married couples only. The
story of how we came to adopt the joint return in 1948 is well known, and
it is uncontroversial to say that the joint return was enacted not as a
result of reasoned tax policy analysis, but rather out of political
peaTie bnues,Sates who ong thefewndveseped coules ughtetain
expediency. Since its adoption, its underlying assumptions have been
challenged on many valid grounds, and yet it remains firmly embedded in
mainstream political and policy discourse. In recent years, most of the
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extended the benefit of the marriage bonuses. The treatment of single
people has received almost no attention.
The scant attention paid to single people is striking in light of the
most recent U.S. census data, which indicate that they are nearing a
majority of the adult population, a trend one demographer describes as a
hclear tipping point."' Moreover, awareness of singles as an overlooked
demographic is starting to permeate the political and popular cultural
consciousness. In addition, economists and other behavioral scientists, as
well as feminist theorists, have begun to study singleness as a social
identity. They have begun to gather persuasive evidence of the costseconomic, social, and psychological-that are imposed on single people,
and to chart the development of a more vibrant social identity for single
people.
This Article draws upon the research and insight from these other
disciplines to assess the negative impact of the joint return on single
people, and to challenge the fundamental assumptions underlying the
joint return. It concludes that single people are unduly penalized under
the joint return, and that it ought to be abolished.
Part I provides a brief historical overview of the joint return. Part II
explains the powerful conceptual framework that has contributed to the
persistence of the joint return, despite the many valid challenges that
have been made to it. Part III then turns to the increasing demographic
presence of single people, and the heightened interest in singleness as a
social identity, both from a popular cultural perspective and as a subject
of social science research. Finally, Part IV draws on the social science
findings and insights to reassess the joint return and the conceptual
framework that supports it. The Article concludes that, because it rests
on flawed assumptions and unduly penalizes single people, the joint
return should be abolished.

I.
A.

THE JOINT RETURN

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The joint return was enacted in 1948 to eliminate the disparate tax
treatment of married couples in community property versus common law
states.2 This disparity had arisen as a result of two Supreme Court

i. See Sam Roberts, 51% of Women Are Now Living Without Spouse, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 6, 2007,
at Ai (quoting William H. Frey, a demographer with the Brooking Institution).
2. The story of how we came to adopt the joint return is well known, though it never ceases to
engage and entertain tax students and scholars. See generally Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation
and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1399-1414 (197); Carolyn C. Jones, Split Income and Separate
Spheres: Ta Law and Gender Roles in the 194os, 6 LAW & HisT. REV. 259 (1988); see also Lily Kahng,
Fiction in Tax, in TAXING AMERICA 25, 26-32 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996).
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decisions, Poe v. Seaborn3 and Lucas v. Earl.4 Poe v. Seaborn held that a
husband and wife in a community property state should each be taxed on
one-half the combined income of the couple, no matter who actually
earned the income.5 The Court reasoned that community property
income vested in the marital unit, not with the individual spouse who
earned it, and that, therefore, half of it belonged to each spouse. The
effect of this treatment, which has come to be called "income splitting,"
is that each spouse's putative half of the income received the benefit of
progressing through the lower tax brackets of the tax rate structure. In
contrast, married couples residing in common law states were not
permitted to income-split, their attempts to do so having been disallowed
in Lucas v. Earl.' In Earl, a husband and wife entered into a contract
under which the husband assigned half of his future income to his wife.
The Court held that all the income first vested in the husband, and was
therefore fully taxable to him.8 Thus, if a married couple had only one
earner, as was typically the case at the time, his income would be allowed
only one progression through the lower tax brackets.
Married couples in common law states were predictably unhappy
with their disadvantageous tax treatment. In order to obtain for their
residents the benefits of income splitting enjoyed by married couples in
community property states, common law states began to switch to
community property regimes, creating upheaval and uncertainty.' In
1948, Congress put an end to the turmoil by adopting the joint return and
setting the amount for each tax bracket at double the amount for
individual returns.'o The effect was that all couples, whether in
community property or common law states, got the benefits of income
splitting.
The 1948 law achieved parity in the tax treatment of married
couples across the country by reducing the tax on married couples in
common law states, but it also created new concerns and complaints."

3.
4.
5.
6.

282 U.S. l (1930).
281 U.S. III (1930).
282 U.S. at I18.
Id. at 117-18.

7. 281 U.S. at 114-15.

8. Id.
9. See Kahng, supra note 2, at 27-28.
so. See Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 471, §H 301-305, 62 Stat. 110, 114 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
I I. For detailed accounts of the politics and legislative activity following the 1948 adoption of the
joint return, see generally Toni Robinson & Mary Moers Wenig, Marry in Haste, Repent at Tax Time:
Marital Status as a Tax Determinant, 8 VA. TAx REv. 773, 776-87 (1989); Lawrence Zelenak, Doing
Something About Marriage Penalties:A Guide for the Perplexed. 54 TAX L. REV. I. 333 (2000): and
Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Politics and Economics of Gender Norms and Competing Family Forms
Under the U.S. Federal Income Tax, 1969-2oo6, at 1-70 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Hastings Law Journal).
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Unmarried taxpayers-including sympathetic widows, widowers, and
others who supported families-were left with a disproportionately
heavy tax burden." To address these concerns, in 1951, Congress added a
new filing status-head of household-for unmarried taxpayers with
dependents, with bracket amounts roughly halfway between those for
single and joint return filers." This proved insufficient to address the
inequity of the tax on single filers, which ranged from twenty to forty
percent higher than that of an equivalent joint filing couple." In 1969, the
bracket amounts for single filers were adjusted so that the tax paid by a
single filer would not exceed by more than twenty percent the tax paid
by an equivalent joint filing couple."
Prior to 1969, married couples never paid more than a comparable
unmarried couple, and sometimes paid less. However, the 1969 law, in
ameliorating the tax burden on single filers, for the first time imposed a
higher tax on a married couple than on an unmarried couple with the
same combined income.'6 Thus, after 1969, single people paid more tax
than a married couple with the same income (though limited by the
twenty percent cap, as described above); married couples sometimes paid
less, sometimes paid more than an unmarried couple with comparable
income. Since then, the tax system has lived with this uneasy distribution
of tax burdens." Many other developed countries, who blindly followed
the United States in adopting the joint return, have since abandoned it.
Today, the United States is one of the few developed countries to retain
the joint return.
12. See Robinson & Wenig, supra note IrI, at 781.

13. Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 183, § 301, 65 Stat. 452, 480 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §

i(b)

(2oo6)).

14. See Robinson & Wenig, supra note ii, at 783. The singles penalty is sometimes characterized
as a marriage bonus, from the perspective of a married couple who pays less in tax than a single person
with the same amount of income. The use of the terms "singles penalty," "marriage bonus," and
'marriage penalty" can be confusing and imprecise. The Article attempts to clarify below. See infra
Parts I.B, I.C.
15. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.).
16. See Bittker, supra note 2, at 1429-31.
17. The relative mix of penalties and bonuses has varied over the years, but in recent years there
has been a marked reduction in the marriage penalties, through a widening of the bracket amounts for
married couples. See MAXIM SHVEDOV, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: STATUTORY INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
RATES AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE TAX SYSTEM: 1988 THROUGH 2oo8, at 6-7 (20o8), available at http://
assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34498_2oo80521.pdf.
18. See Edward J. McCaffery, Where's the Sex in Fiscal Sociology? Taxation and Gender in
Comparative Perspective 6-7 (Univ. S. Cal. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No.
70, 2oo8), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1o2o36o.
19. CONG. OF THE U.S., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 59 (1997) [hereinafter CBO, FOR BETTER OR WORSE], available at

http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/oxxldoc7/marriage.pdf

(indicating that in i993, nineteen out of twenty-

seven OECD countries taxed husbands and wives separately); ORG. FOR EcoN. COOPERATION & DEV.,
FUNDAMENTAL REFORM OF THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX 54-56 (2006); Joseph A. Pechman & Gary V.
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PENALTIES AND BONUSES DEFINED

As described above, the joint return imposes differing tax burdens
depending on a person's marital status and income level. The terms
"marriage bonus," "marriage penalty," and "singles penalty" are
commonly used to describe these differing tax burdens, but the terms are
sometimes used imprecisely. In particular, the term "singles penalty" has
two distinct meanings, which leads to confusion in discussion and
analysis. In one sense, it is used in the context of comparing the relative
tax burdens of a married couple, on the one hand, and an unmarried
couple, on the other; in another sense, it is used to describe the relative
tax burdens of a married couple on the one hand, and an uncoupled
person on the other. This section defines these two meanings of singles
penalty precisely and, in order to avoid confusion, adopts new terms for
each.
As commonly used, the terms "marriage bonus" or "marriage
penalty" describe the comparative tax burdens of two couples who are
similarly situated except that one is married and filing jointly, and the
other is unmarried, with each person filing an individual return. In some
cases, the married couple will pay less than the unmarried couple-a
marriage bonus.20 In other cases, the married couple will pay more than
the unmarried couple - a marriage penalty."
In comparing the two couples, if the referent couple is the
unmarried couple, obviously the bonus and penalty will be reversed. The
penalty and bonus from this perspective are sometimes called the singles
penalty and bonus." Of course, the two people who comprise the
unmarried couple are not single in the sense of being uncoupled, but
rather single in the sense of being unmarried. Their penalty or bonus, as
compared to the married couple, can more precisely be called the
unmarriedcouple's penalty or bonus.

Englehardt, The Income Tax Treatment of the Family: An InternationalPerspective, 43 NAT'L TAX J. i,

7-Jo (1990) (identifying a "world-wide trend" toward individual filing and away from joint filing).
Many countries appear to have moved to individual filing to capture the labor efficiency gains

of taxing married women at lower marginal rates. See McCaffery, supra note 8. at 6-7. Efficiency is
often a popular and forceful rationale for changing tax laws in the United States (witness recent
rounds of tax cuts on high incomes and capital gains and dividends). See William G. Gale et al.,
Distribution of the 200I and 2oo3 Tax Cuts and Their Financing, 103 TAX NOTES 1539, 1542-44 (2oo4).

Given the well-documented inefficiencies engendered by the joint return, our continued embrace of it
is surprising.
20. In general, marriage bonuses sometimes occur where one member of the couple earns a
relatively large proportion of the couple's combined income. See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying
text.
21. In general, marriage penalties sometimes occur where the earnings of each member of the
couple are roughly equal. See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
22. see, e.g., JANE GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.. FEDERAL INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF THE
FAMILY

I8-22

(2009).
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A different meaning of the term "singles penalty" arises in
considering the relative tax burdens of married couples and uncoupled,
single individuals. When an uncoupled, single person pays more than a
married couple with the same income, this is also called the singles
penalty.23 In addition, the reverse of this is called the marriage bonus. To
be more precise, and to avoid confusion with the newly named
unmarried couple bonus or penalty, it can be called the single person's
penalty.
C. QUANTIFYING PENALTIES AND BONUSES
i. Unmarried Couple Penalties and Bonuses
Quantifying unmarried couple penalties and bonuses is more
difficult than initially appears.2 4 For example, the Congressional Budget
Office estimated the net amount of unmarried couple penalties (that is,
total penalties minus total bonuses) for the year 1999 to be either $io
billion or $49 billion, depending on the assumptions used." Using yet
another set of assumptions, the Treasury Department's Office of Tax
Analysis estimated unmarried couples to have a net bonus of $1.6 billion
in 1999.20 There does not appear to be a consensus on which assumptions
are the most reasonable:
The difficulties of accurately defining and measuring marriage tax
penalties and bonuses cannot be over stressed. From a theoretical
perspective it is not even clear what the appropriate base line
comparison should be: should it be the tax consequences if two single
individuals decide to marry or, should it be the tax consequences if a
married couple were allowed to file as two separate individuals?
Furthermore, the basic economic characteristics of married couples,
heads of households and single individuals are different. As a result,
including children, unearned income, and itemized deductions into the
calculations can introduce measurement errors that reflect these basic
differences in the economic characteristics of the filing units rather
than the marriage tax penalties and bonuses that arise because of the
structural components of the tax system.27

23. See, e.g., James Alm et al., Is There a "Singles Tax"? The Relative Income Tax Treatment of
Single Households, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Summer 2002, at 69 (explaining that the "singles tax" is the

higher tax imposed on an uncoupled single person relative to an equal-income married couple).
24. Unmarried couple bonuses and penalties are mirror images of marriage penalties and
bonuses. The following discussion describes various estimates of marriage penalties and bonuses,
except that the figures are recast as unmarried couple bonuses and penalties.
25. GREGG A. ESENWEIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX AND THE TREATMENT

OF MARRIED COUPLES: BACKGROUND

AND ANALYSIS

9 (2oo), available at http://stuff.mit.edu/afs/

sipb.mit.edulcontrib/wikileaks-crs/wikileaks-crs-reports/RL3o8oo.pdf.
26. Id. These estimates of net bonus or penalty require the calculation of married couples' tax
liabilities assuming they are not married. This. in turn, requires assumptions about how income and
deductions would be allocated between the two individuals, the filing status they would choose, and
how they would report any children they have. Id. at 7-927. Id. at 9-xo (footnote omitted).
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There does, however, appear to be general agreement that the tax
system has moved in the direction of greater unmarried couple penalties
(i.e., greater marriage bonuses) since 2001, when several provisions
reducing marriage penalties were enacted.8 The Joint Committee on
Taxation estimated that the combined cost of all of the marriage penalty
relief provisions enacted in 2001 will be $63 billion over the fiscal year
period 2002 through 20II.29 Researchers at the Treasury Department
Office of Tax Analysis, applying the same methodology that resulted in
an estimated net unmarried couple bonus in 1999,30 estimated a net $30
billion unmarried couple penalty in 2004.31
Another method of measuring unmarried couple bonuses and
penalties compares married and unmarried couples at different income
levels, with different income splits, assuming that all income is earned,
assuming no dependents, and using the standard deduction in all cases.
This is shown in Table 1:
TABLE 1: MARRIAGE TAX PENALTIES AND BONUSES IN 200032
(ASSUMING ALL EARNED INCOME AND USE OF THE STANDARD DEDUCTION)

Total
Income

Income Taxes
(if filing jointly)
50/50

Tax Penalties and Bonuses
(Tax bonuses shown in parentheses)
If income is split between the spouses:
00/0
70/30
60/4o
$400
$373
($862)

$20,000

$1058

$276

$30,000

$2558

$218

$218

$324

($862)

$40,000

$218

$218

$218

$50,ooo

$4058
$5558

$218

$218

$16

($1714)
($3014)

$75,000

$11,674

$1530

$io82

$107

($4026)

$Iooooo

$18,674

$1530

$1530

$io82

($4776)

$150,ooo

$33,607

$2208

$1885

$1435

($6033)

$250,000

$69,314

$6915

$6224

$4772

($7133)

$500,ooo

$167,758

$14,864

$14,986

$13,590

($6170)

28. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2oo (EGTRRA) enacted three
marriage tax penalty relief provisions: (i) it increased the standard deduction for joint returns to twice
the size of the standard deduction for single returns, (2) it increased the width of the fifteen percent

tax bracket for joint returns to twice the width of the fifteen percent tax bracket for single returns, and
(3) it increased the earned income tax credit phaseout start and end points for joint returns by $3000.
See Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). The changes
were phased in over several years, and are slated to expire at the end of 2010. See id.
29. GREGG A. ESENWEIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MARRIAGE TAX PENALTY RELIEF PRovisioNs OF
THE EcoNoMic GROWTH AND TAX RELIEF RECONCILIATION AcT OF 2001, at 5 (2003), available at http://

stuff.mit.edu/afs/sipb/contrib/wikileaks-crs/wikileaks-crs-reports/RS21ooo.pdf; see also GRAVELLE, supra
note 22, at 23.
30. See ESENWEIN, supra note 25, at 9.
31. Robert Gillette et al., Marriage Penalties and Bonuses: A Longer Term 468--78 (unpublished
manuscript, presented at the Proceeding of the National Tax Association) (Dec. 2004).
32. ESENWEIN, supra note 25, at 12.
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The Table above shows marriage bonuses as negative values (in
parentheses) and marriage penalties as positive values. By simply
switching the labels, the figures can be recast as unmarried couple
penalties (the negative values in parentheses) and unmarried couple
bonuses (the positive values). The chart reveals certain patterns in
penalties and bonuses. Unmarried couples with relatively equal
individual incomes tend to enjoy a bonus relative to that of comparable
married couples.33 Conversely, unmarried couples with relatively unequal
individual incomes tend to incur a penalty relative to that of comparable
married couples.34 Except at the highest income levels, unmarried couple
penalties are much larger than unmarried couple bonuses.
2.
Single Person'sPenalties
Like the unmarried couple bonus and penalty, the specific amount
of the single person's penalty varies depending on income levels, along
with the assumptions made in computing the tax. Unlike the unmarried
couple bonus and penalty, however, little attention has been paid to
quantifying the single person's penalty. To date, there has only been one
study, by economists James Alm, Leslie Whittington, and Jason Fletcher,
attempting to quantify the single person's penalty." Using some
simplifying assumptions, they found that in 2001, the single person's
penalty ranged from $o to about $78oo.37 They roughly estimate that
single taxpayers, in the aggregate, paid a penalty of nearly $47 billion in
1996.38 This figure has most likely increased as a result of two factors: an
increase in the number of single taxpayers since 1996,39 and tax law
changes enacted in 2001. The changes were intended to decrease
marriage penalties, but also had the effect of increasing single person's
penalties.40

33. Id. at Io.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 32.
36. See Alm et al., supra note 23.

37. See id. at 76. In computing the single person's penalties, Alm and his coauthors use one
personal exemption and the standard deduction for the single person's tax liability, and two personal
exemptions and the standard deduction for the married couple's tax liability. See id. at 73.
38. See id. at 81.
39. Alm and his coauthors estimated 52,000,00o single taxpayers in 1996. Id. In 20o6, there were
almost 62,000,000. See IRS, STATISTIC OF INCOME-INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS PUBLICATION I304
tbl.2.4 (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soilo7in24ms.xls.
40. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 created a new ten percent

rate, with the bracket amount for joint filers equal to two times that for single filers. See SHVEDOV,
supra note 17, at 6. It also increased the width of the fifteen percent bracket for joint filers to twice
that for single filers. Id. at 6-7. Finally, it increased the standard deduction for joint filers to twice that
for single filers. Id. at 7. All of these changes were intended to decrease the married couple's penalty,
and also had the effect of increasing the single person's penalty. Using assumptions similar to those of
Alm and his coauthors, one commentator estimates the single person's penalty for 2007 to be as high
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It is important to note that there is never a single person's bonusthat is, a single person never pays less relative to a couple, whether
married or unmarried, with the same amount of income as the single
person.4'
To summarize, there are both unmarried couple's penalties and
single person's penalties under our tax system-that is, both unmarried
couples and single people sometimes pay more tax than a married couple
with the same income. On the flip side, there is also sometimes an
unmarried couple bonus-an unmarried couple can pay less tax than a
married couple with the same income. In contrast, there is never a single
person's bonus-a single person never pays less tax than a married
couple with the same income.42

II.

THE "MARITAL UNIT": THE PROBLEM, NOT THE SOLUTION

As Part I describes, the joint return was adopted not as a result of
reasoned tax policy analysis, but rather out of political expediency.43 It
was only after its enactment that the joint return was retrofitted with a
conceptual foundation-the notion of the married couple as a "single
economic unit."" Boris Bittker famously framed the debate as a set of
"insoluble dilemmas." He articulated three ideals that cannot be attained
simultaneously: the first, horizontal equity, or couples equality-that is,
taxing equal-income married couples equally; the second, a progressive

as $99oo. See James Larson, Taxes- Marriage Tax Penalty/Single's Tax Penalty (2007), http://
www.green5.org/MarriageTaxPenalty.xls.
41. This is true as a mathematical matter, given the rate structure. Married couples have wider tax
brackets than single people and so, given equal amounts of income, the tax liability of the married
couple will be lower. Unmarried couples at worst will have the same tax liability as a single person
with the same income, assuming all the income is attributed to one member of the couple (even then,
the unmarried couple will probably have a lower tax liability by reason of an extra dependent
exemption). If,on the other hand, the two members of the unmarried couple each contribute a portion
of their total income, they will benefit from separate progressions through the lower tax brackets.
42. To close the loop on these comparisons, an unmarried couple can pay less than a single
person if both members of the couple contribute to the couple's combined income because the income
of each member of the couple will have a separate progression through the tax brackets. A single
person will never pay less than the unmarried couple.
43. See, e.g., GRAVELLE, supra note 22, at 5 ("[The adoption of the joint return] had little to do
with any theory regarding the tax treatment of the family."); id. at iI (describing the joint return as
"haphazard"); HAROLD MARTIN GROVES, FEDERAL TAx TREATMENT OF THE FAMILY 17 (1963) (describing
the joint return as the product of historical developments rather than design; effects not carefully
weighed nor consciously intended); Bittker, supra note 2, at 1416 (stating that the joint return was
adopted without considering effects on marriage neutrality); Oliver Oldman & Ralph Temple,
Comparative Analysis of the Taxation of Married Persons, 12

STAN.

L. REV. 585, 593 (x96o) (positing

that the joint return was probably the product of political expediency rather than conscious policy
decision); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 347 (1994) (noting
that the 1948 legislation was essentially a historical accident).
44. See Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family--The Revenue Act of 1948, 6x HARv. L.
REV. 1097, 1162 (1948).
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rate structure; and the third, marriage neutrality-that is, not penalizing
or rewarding the choice to marry.45
The Bittker framework has come to be the dominant one.' 6 While it
has an internal logical consistency-it is true that the three articulated
goals cannot be achieved at the same time-the first goal has disturbing
circularity insofar as it serves as the rationale for the joint return. If one
begins, as Bittker does, with the proposition that equal-income married
couples ought to pay equal amounts of tax, then the assumption must be
that the married couple is the appropriate unit for making the pair-bypair comparisons required by horizontal equity, and that equal-income
married couples are the same in ways that matter for tax purposes.47
The most literal basis for this assumption derives from the Poe v.
Seaborn concept of income splitting-that husband and wife share
equally in the income produced within the marital unit, regardless of
which spouse actually produces the income.48 If they share equally, then
the tax result is equivalent whether each is taxed individually on one-half
the income, or whether the income is aggregated and taxed under a joint
return rate schedule with tax brackets double the amount of the
individual rate schedule. If, however, spouses do not share equally, the
equivalence fails. Thoughtful scholars have challenged the equal-sharing
claim, and found that equal-income married couples differ widely in the
extent to which they pool their income and make joint decisions about
consumption.49 Conversely, people other than married couples-such as

45. See Bittker, supra note 2, at 1419-20. As Lawrence Zelenak points out, Bittker was not the
first to explain the marriage tax dilemma in this way. See Zelenak, supra note Ii,at 6 n.26. Professor
Zelenak cites a 1972 statement as the earliest of which he is aware. Id. (citing Tax Treatment of Single
Persons and Married Persons Where Both Spouses Are Working, Hearings Before the H. Ways and
Means Comm., 92d Cong. 78-79 (1972) (statement of Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant Treasury Sec'y)).
Nonetheless, Bittker's article was extremely influential, and he is the one who has become most
closely identified with what I call the "Bittker framework."
46. See, e.g., PAUL McDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION CASES AND MATERIALS 971 (5th
ed. 2004); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 468 (6th ed.
2oo8); JANE G. GRAVELLE, THE MARRIAGE TAX PENALTY 53 (2003); see also Alm et al., supra note 23, at
85-86; CBO, FOR BETTER OR WORSE, supra note 19, at 2-6.
47. As scholars have pointed out, the whole enterprise of horizontal equity is disturbingly
circular. Not only must one assume that the married couple is the appropriate unit of comparison, one
must also assume that income is the appropriate metric by which to determine whether two units are
equally situated. It seems that all the difficult judgments must be made in advance of actually applying
the horizontal equity criterion. See Thomas D. Griffith, Should "Tax Norms" Be Abandoned?
Rethinking Tax Policy Analysis and the Taxation of PersonalInjury Awards, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 1115,
1155-56; Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 139
(1989) (critiquing horizontal equity as devoid of normative value). But see Richard A. Musgrave,
Horizontal Equity Once More, 43 NAT'L TAX

J.

I13 (1990) (defending horizontal equity).

48. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. ioi, no-II (1930)
49. See Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating the Income Tax
Burden, 59 TEX. L.REV. I, 24-27 (1980); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family,
Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGs L.J. 63, 80-92 (1993). But see Zelenak,
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unmarried couples and roommates-sometimes do pool resources and
make joint consumption decisions. 0 Therefore, if the joint return is
premised on equal sharing, it is both overinclusive (including married
couples who do not share) and underinclusive (excluding unmarried
persons who do share)."
Another important challenge to the notion that equal-income
married couples are equal for tax purposes focuses on the differences
between single- and dual-income couples. A single-income couple
benefits from the value of household and other unpaid services
performed by the stay-at-home spouse (imputed income) and, as a result,
is better off than a comparable dual-income couple." In addition, a dualincome couple incurs more in the way of nondeductible expenses of
producing income, such as childcare, clothing, and commuting expenses,
also leaving them worse off than the single-income couple." Again, the
rationale for the joint return-treating equal-income couples equally-is
undermined to the extent that equal-income couples are shown to differ
in these significant ways.
An even more fundamental challenge to the Bittker assumption is
to question why coupled people (whether married or not) should be
treated in a separate category from single people to begin with.54 Of
course, the obvious alternative is to treat all people individually, and
many scholars have argued for just that."
Despite all of these challenges, the joint return, along with the
notion that the couple (whether married or not) ought to be a
fundamental unit for tax purposes, remains firmly embedded in
mainstream political and policy discourse." In recent years, the debate
regarding the joint return has not questioned the primacy of the couple
as taxpayer, focusing rather on whether and to what extent couples
supra note 43, at 348-55 (challenging the claim that many married couples do not share consumption,
and concluding that most spouses do share equally in consumption).
50. See Kornhauser, supra note 49, at 103.
51. See Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805, 851-53 (2008)
[hereinafter Cain, Taxing Families]; Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There's No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAc L.
REV. 27, 54-60 (1996); Shari Motro, A New "I Do": Towards a Marriage-NeutralIncome Tax, 92 IowA
L. REV. 1509, 1540-44 (2oo6).

52. See generally Nancy D. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571 (1996).
53. See Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender
Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1005-1o (1993).

54. 1 use the descriptors "single" or "uncoupled" to mean people who are not in a committed
romantic relationship; this is a different group from those who are "unmarried," as this latter group
includes both single people and coupled people who are not married.
55. See, e.g., Gann, supra note 49, at 32-52; Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax
Policy, Jo1 W. VA. L. REV. 129, 154-57 (1998); Kornhauser, supra note 49, at io8-ii; Harvey S. Rosen,
Is It Time to Abandon Joint Filing?,30 NAT'L TAx J. 423, 427 (1977); Zelenak, supra note 43, at 378.

56. See generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, wedded to the Joint Return: Culture and the
Persistence of the Marital Unit in the American Income Tax (June 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Hastings Law Journal); Zelenak, supra note iI; CBO, FOR BETrER OR WORSE, supra note 19-
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should suffer marriage penalties or enjoy marriage bonuses, and who
among the universe of couples ought to be eligible for the marriage
bonus." The treatment of single individuals has received almost no
attention.
III.
A.

SINGLE PEOPLE: AN EMERGING MAJORITY

DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

The scant attention paid to single people is striking in light of the
most recent U.S. census data, which indicate that forty-five percent of
households in the United States are now headed by unmarried men or
women.'" In 2008, unmarried and single people comprised forty-three
percent of all adults age eighteen and older.59 An even more eyecatching, but less accurate, statistic is that fifty-one percent of adult
women (and forty-seven percent of adult men) are now single.t Because
the census data supporting this statement encompass females and males
as young as fifteen years of age -who are highly unlikeiy to be married the data are skewed in favor of the single category. ' However, even
adjusting for this skewing, the trend toward being single is undeniable,
with increasing numbers of people being single for a longer period of
their adult lives. According to demographer William Frey, the 2006

57. See, e.g., Cain, Taxing Families, supra note 51, at 851-52 (advocating spousal treatment for
same sex couples); Motro, supra note 51, at 1544-50 (advocating joint filing for couples, relatives, or
friends, provided they share legal entitlement to all taxable income); Wendy Richards, An Analysis of
Recent Tax Reforms from a MaritalBias Perspective: It Is Time to Oust Marriage from the Tax Code,
2oo8 Wis. L. REV. 61i, 652-53 (advocating new filing status for dual-earner married couples); Zelenak,
supra note II.

58. U.S. Census Bureau, Press Release, Facts for Features: Unmarried and Single Americans
Week (July 21, 2009), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/pdf/cbo9ffi8_unmarriedo9.pdf.
59. Id. Of this group, sixty-one percent had never been married, twenty-four percent were
divorced, and fifteen percent were widowed. Id.
6o. See Roberts, supra note I.
61. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2005-2007 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY, TABLE SI201: MARITAL
STATUS (2oo8), available at ftp://www2.census.gov/acs/downloads/shells/2007/subjects/SI20.xls. This
figure has crept up a bit and is now at fifty-two percent of adult women and forty-eight percent of
adult men. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2oo6-2oo8

AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY, TABLE S12o1: MARITAL

STATUS, available at http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/users-guide/2oo6-2oo8/shells/subject/
S12ol.xls.
62. For example, in 1950, sixty-five percent of women lived with a spouse; today forty-nine
percent do so. See Roberts, supra note i. On average, Americans spend half their adult lives outside
marriage. See id. (quoting Stephanie Coontz, Director of Public Education for the Council on
Contemporary Families). The trend is driven by a number of factors: young adults are delaying
marriage longer, more marriages are ending in divorce in a shorter period of time, and more women
who divorce or are widowed are remaining unmarried longer and living longer. See id.; see also U.S.
CENSUS

BUREAU, THE

LIVING ARRANGEMENTS

POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATEs: DYNAMIC

VERSION, FAMILY AND

IN 2005, available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/pop-profile/files/

dynamic/FamiliesLA.pdf.

HeinOnline -- 61 Hastings L.J. 663 2009-2010

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

664

[Vol. 61:651

census findings are a "clear tipping point."" Marriage historian Stephanie
Coontz describes them as "yet another of the inexorable signs that there
is no going back to a world where we can assume that marriage is the
main institution that organizes people's lives."6 '
B.

POPULAR CONSCIOUSNESS

Awareness of singles as an overlooked demographic is starting to
permeate the political and popular cultural consciousness. For example,
there are now organizations, such as Unmarried America6 and the
Alternatives to Marriage Projecti whose goals are to provide
information about, and to advocate for, singles and other unmarried
individuals. Marketers and advertisers are beginning to identify singles as
a new and valuable demographic, as evidenced by magazines such as the
Los Angeles-based Singular, whose goal is to "position the single
lifestyle in today's consumer marketplace, as a positive state-of-mind and
fulfilling way-of-life,"" and websites such as Single Edition, which
describes itself as a "lifestyle destination for singles."" New (and
unfortunate) terms such as "quirkyalone"6 and "singlism"o have entered
the lexicon, along with the obligatory self-confessional blogs.7 '
One prominent theme throughout the heightened media and
marketing focus on single people is the extent to which they are socially
and economically disadvantaged. Socially, single people are portrayed as
pathetic, unfulfilled, selfish, immature, socially inept, or some
combination thereof." For example, last winter, Ed Rendell, governor of
Pennsylvania, remarked that Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano, who is

63. See Roberts, supra note i (quoting William H. Frey, a demographer with the Brooking
Institution).
64. See id.
65. Unmarried America, An Information Service for the New Unmarried Majority, http://
www.unmarriedamerica.org/ (last visited Jan. 1z, zoio).
66. Alternatives to Marriage Project, http://www.unmarried.org/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
67. PR News Online, Singular Magazine Debuts to Celebrate the Single Lifestyle (June 18, 2oo8).
http://www.prnewsonline.com/prnewswire/2753.html.
68. Single Edition, About Us, http://www.singleedition.com/about-singleeditioncom/our-story/
about-us.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).

69. "Quirkyalone n./adj. A person who enjoys being single (but is not opposed to being in a
relationship) and generally prefers to be alone rather than date for the sake of being in a couple."
SASHA CAGEN,

QUIRKYALONE: A MANIFESTO FOR UNCOMPROMISING ROMANTICS 5 (2004); see also

Quirkyalone: It's a Mindset, http://quirkyalone.net/index.php/about-2/quirkyalone/ (last visited Jan.
12, 2oo).
70. "Singlism" is a term coined by Bella DePaulo and Wendy Morris to describe the negative
stereotyping of single people. See BELLA DEPAULO, SINGLED OuT: How SINGLES ARE STEREOTYPED,
STIGMATIZED, AND IGNORED, AND STILL LIVE HAPPILY EVER AFrER 2 (2006).
71. See, eg, Singletude: A Positive Blog for Singles, http://singletude.blogspot.coml (last visited
Jan. 12, 201lo); Therapeutic Conversations for Singles, http://www.crystalmonae.blogspot.com/ (last
visited Jan. 12, 2010).
72. See infra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
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unmarried and childless, was "perfect" as President Obama's choice to
be the head of homeland security "because, for that job, you have to
have no life. Janet has no family. Perfect. She can devote, literally, I%-20
hours a day to it."73 Rendell came under fire, in part for his negative
stereotyping of singles as having "no life." 74 (He was also criticized for
being sexist and a boor and a sore loser.)75 He ended up apologizing "if
anybody out there was offended." 6
In terms of economic status, the popular media outlets decry the
variety of ways in which consumer and labor markets discriminate (in the
economic sense of price discrimination) between single persons, on the
one hand, and couples or families, on the other. For example, families or
couples are often offered discounts on consumption items like vacation
travel and lodging, restaurant meals, and health or country club
memberships." Similarly, employers often provide benefits such as health
and life insurance at a discounted cost to spouses and other family
members of their employees, in effect paying them more than single
employees."
Commentators also catalog the various pernicious governmental
policies and programs under which single people are treated unfavorably.
For example, military pay is widely disparate for single personnel and
those who are married and/or have children,79 with single personnel

73. Gail Collins, Op-Ed., One Singular Sensation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2oo8, at A43, available at
http://www.nytimes.coml/2oo8/12/o4/opinion/o4iht-edcollins.i.i84o3897.html (quoting Governor Rendell).
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., id.; Connie Schultz, She Doesn't Have a Life? He Doesn't Have a Clue, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), Dec. 7, 2oo8, at G4. But see Jill Porter, Can't Blame Ed for Tellin' It Like It Is,
PILA. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 5, 2oo8, at 5.
76. E.g., Angela Couloumbis & Mario F. Cattabiani, Rendell Plays Down Remarks-He Said
Homeland Security Secretary-Designate Had "No Family" and "No Life", PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 4,
2oo8, at B i.
77. See, e.g., Amey Stone, The High Cost of Not Marrying, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Feb. 25, 2004,
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/feb2oo4/nf2oo4o2256278_dbo35.htm.
78. See, e.g., Thomas F. Coleman, The High Cost of Being Single in America or the Financial
Consequences of Marital Status Discrimination (Aug. 7, 2004), http://www.unmarriedamerica.org/
cost-discrimination.htm; Leslie Talbot, Stop Singlism!, FoRBES MAG., Aug. 21, 2007, http://
www.forbes.com/2oo7/o8/21/talbot-singles-discrimination-forbeslife-singleso7_cx_1t-o82italbot.html.
Commentators also report that in response to the changing demographic landscape, some
employers have begun to offer benefits to an expanded universe of "family members," including
unmarried domestic partners (same or opposite sex), grown children, or extended family members.
See, e.g., Michelle Conlin, Unmarried America, BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 20, 2003, at 1o9. The redefinition
of family is another demographic shift that sometimes aligns, but sometimes conflicts, with the agenda
of singles advocacy and awareness groups. Constituents of the "redefined family" group and the
"singles" group are aligned in their opposition to the traditional married couple (preferably with
children) as the sole privileged social arrangement, but they diverge in their preferred alternative. This
Article focuses primarily on single people versus coupled people (most of whom are married).
79. See Leslie Talbot, Opinion: Unmarried in the Military? Still a Long way to Go (June so.
2008), http://www.unmarried.org/unmarried-in-the-military.html.

HeinOnline -- 61 Hastings L.J. 665 2009-2010

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

666

[Vol. 61:651

earning as little as fifty-two percent of their peers with families.& Social
security benefits, as a function of the amount of taxes paid into the
system, are up to eighty-five percent higher for a married couple than for
some single individuals." Not surprisingly, the single's tax penalty under
the joint return regime features prominently on this list of grievances.
Some of the popular commentary on the single's tax penalty is quite
balanced. For example, the Alternatives to Marriage Project provides a
lucid description of the marriage bonus and provides the following
example of how it can result in unfair treatment to the single taxpayer:
To see how marriage bonuses are unfair to unmarried people,
imagine two employees. Each earns the same salary. One is unmarried;
the other has a spouse who is an unpaid caretaker or earns a very low
income. The married employee pays lower taxes, ending up with more
take-home pay than the unmarried employee.8'
The discussion goes on to point out that there is also a marriage penalty
for relatively high-income married couples where each spouse earns a
significant amount and certain low-income couples eligible for the
earned income credit.83
Others are more incendiary in their presentation of the issue.
Unmarried America's "Human Rights Program for Unmarried
America" for example, asserts that "[m]arried couples with children are
getting tax breaks from Congress while single people are left out totally
or get leftover table scraps."" A tax and financial reporter for MSN
describes it this way: "Forget the marriage penalty. The fact is singles get
a worse break from the U.S. Tax Code than married people do." 85 By
way of example, he compares two individuals, each with $ioo,ooo of
taxable income, one with a stay-at-home spouse and the other single, and
determines that the single person pays about $4150 more in taxes than
the married person.
Many of the claims about the disparate treatment of single people
are factually plausible, but whether such treatment is morally or legally

8o. See Jim Garamone, Review Panel Recommends Military Pay Changes, U.S.

DEP'T OF DEF.

Mar. 13, 2008.
81. See Coleman, supra note 78; see also Philip J. Harmelink & Janet Furman Speyrer. Social
Security: Rates of Returns and the Fairness of Benefits, 14 CATO J. 37, 51 (1994) (concluding that of four
inequities in the social security system-marital status, gender, age, and income-marital status is the
most important, with rates of return for one-earner couples -'up to 40 percent higher than for twoearner couples and up to 85 percent higher than for single males").
82. See Alternatives to Marriage Project, Federal Income Taxes, http://www.unmarried.org/
federal-income-taxes.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
ARMED FORCES PRESS SERV.,

83. Id.
84. Unmarried America, Support Our Human Rights Program for Unmarried America, http://
www.unmarriedamerica.orgfhumanrightsagenda.htmi (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
85. See Jeff Schnepper, How the Tax Code Makes Singles Suffer. MSN MONEY, June 22. 2004,
http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/Taxes/P82377.asp.
86. Id. (example based on tax rates in effect for 2004).
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objectionable is less clear. For example, differential pricing-that is, the
pricing of goods and services to differentiate between single individuals
and couples or larger families-clearly does occur for consumption items
such as vacation travel or health club memberships.8 ' However, basic
microeconomic theory holds that price discrimination- separating out
different consumers with different preferences for a particular good or
service, and charging them different prices-can sometimes improve the
functioning of markets, and lead to an increase in overall social welfare.88
Even though consumers do not like it, it is generally tolerated, and
absent special circumstances (implicating antitrust laws or laws
forbidding discrimination on the basis of suspect groups such as racial
minorities), the government will not intervene to restrict it." Of course,
consumers are free to engage in self-help-that is, mobilize their market
power as a group and hold out for a better price.' To some extent, that
appears to be the goal of the organizations described above. 9'
To evaluate all the specific claims about the treatment of single
people is beyond the scope of this Article.? However, these types of
claims illustrate the heightened awareness of this demographic that has
begun to enter our collective consciousness, and provide an entry point
into more serious research about the treatment of single people.
C.

ACADEMIC RESEARCH AND FINDINGS

The popular media clearly demonstrates a heightened awareness of
single people as an overlooked or poorly treated demographic, but casual
observations in the popular media are insufficient to establish the
87. For example, consumer discounts are offered to married people for auto and renters'
insurance, health club and country club memberships, and automobile clubs. See Stone, supra note 77.
88. See John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting
Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 228-29 (2oo8); William F. Baxter
& Daniel P. Kessler, Toward a Consistent Theory of the Welfare Analysis of Agreements, 47 STAN. L.

615, 623-25 (1995). The basic intuition is that, by charging different prices to different consumers,
instead of a single price to all consumers, a seller will be able to sell more units, thereby increasing
REV.

profits. See Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, Why (and How) Fairness Matters at the
IP/AntitrustInterface, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1817, 1865-70 (2003).

89. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Market Power and Secondary-Line Differential Pricing,71
GEo. L.J. 1157, 1157-77 (1983) (describing conditions under which differential pricing violates

antitrust laws, and other conditions in which it does not).
90. For a detailed analysis of the desirability and legality of group purchasing organizations, see
Jonathan M. Jacobsen & Gary J. Dorman, Joint Purchasing,Monopsony and Antitrust, 36

ANTITRUST

BULL. I(1991).

91. See, e.g., National Singles Association, http://www.r-u-single.com/content.aspx?pageid=o&clubjid=276423 (last visited Jan. 12, 20o). The National Singles Association is an organization
that appears to be modeled on the American Association of Retired People, which, in exchange for a
membership fee, offers discounts on travel; hotels; restaurants; electronics; legal, accounting, and
financial services; books; music; and entertainment. See id.
92. Of course, the specific claims about the tax treatment of single people under the joint return
will be thoroughly evaluated. See infra Part IV.
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existence of a problem. This section will examine the research of
economists and other behavioral scientists, who have begun to study
single people as a group.
i. Wage Discrimination
With regard to the workplace, labor economists have observed for
some time that married men are paid more than unmarried men.'
However, the cause of this "marital wage premium," estimated to be
from ten to forty percent,94 has been difficult to ascertain." The most
common theories are that: (i) marriage allows men to specialize in
nonhousehold production (the "specialization theory"),
(2) the
characteristics that make men attractive to employers also makes them
attractive as husbands (the "selection theory"),7 and (3) employers
discriminate in favor of married men (the "discrimination theory"). In
this context, discrimination is defined to occur when "workers do not
receive pay or remuneration commensurate with their productivitywhen, in short, equal productivity is not rewarded with equal pay." 9 The
employer might be interpreting marriage as a signal that the employee is
stable and responsible, or might consciously or unconsciously give
preference to married men in raises and promotions on the assumption
that they have a family to support.o
Until recently, most empirical research focused primarily on the
specialization and selection theories.o' The discrimination theory has
received less attention, in part, perhaps, because of difficulties in

93. See generally Joni Hersh & Leslie S. Stratton, Household Specialization and the Male
Marriage Wage Premium, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 78 (2000); Lawrence W. Kenny, The
Accumulation of Human Capital During Marriage by Males, 21 ECON. INQUIRY 223 (1983); Sanders
Korenman & David Neumark, Does Marriage Really Make Men More Productive?, 26 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 282 (1991); Eng Seng Loh, Productivity Differences and the Marriage Wage Premium for
White Males, 31 J. Hum. RESOURCES 566 (1996).
94. See Jeffrey S. Gray, The Fall in Men's Return to Marriage: Declining Productivity Effects or
Changing Selection?, 32 J. HUM. RESOURCES 481, 481-82 ('997).
95. See Leslie S. Stratton, Examining the Wage Differential for Married and Cohabiting Men, 40
EcoN. INQUIRY 199, 199 (2002).

96. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of the Marriage, Part I,81 J. POL. ECON. 813, 813-15 (973)
Gary S. Becker, Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor, 3 J. LAB. ECON. S33, S34-36
(1985).
97. See GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 66-77 (1981); Christopher Cornwell & Peter

Rupert, Unobservable Individual Effects, Marriage, and the Earnings of Young Men, 35 EcON. INQUIRY
285,285-86 (1997).

98. See Martha S. Hill, The Wage Effects of Marital Status and Children, 14 J. HUM. RESOURCES
579, 592 (1979).

99. Dennis J. Aigner & Glen G. Cain, Statistical Theories of Discriminationin Labor Markets, 30
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 175, 177 (1977).

ioo. Abbigail J. Chiodo & Michael T. Owyang, For Love or Money: Why Married Men Make
More, REIBONAL EcoNoMlsT, Apr. 2002, at 10, 10.
101l.See Michael Zimmer, Employer Discrimination and the Earnings Premium of Married Men:
Evidence From Quantile Regressions, 32 J. EcoN. I (2006).
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detecting and measuring discrimination.' 2 In the last few years, however,
some evidence has emerged to support the discrimination theory. In
2004, Kate Antonovics and Robert Town devised an ingenious way to
eliminate the selection theory as a possible cause of the marital wage
premium: They studied pairs of monozygotic twins in which one twin
married and the other did not. Because twins are genetically and
(usually) environmentally identical, they should be equally productive
workers, which effectively removes the possibility that any marital wage
premium is attributable to the selection of more productive men into
marriage." Antonovics and Town found that the marital wage premium
persisted (with the married twins earning on average twenty-six percent
more than the single twins).o' They also found little support for the
specialization theory as an explanation for the premium."o0 However,
they stop short of concluding that the discrimination theory is the most
likely explanation for the marital wage premium, and instead offer an
alternative theory-that married men earn more because they work
harder and more assertively seek out raises and better job
opportunities.
Two other recent studies, both of which examine the relative
earnings of single and married men across income levels, have also found
evidence of employer discrimination among men who are young or
relatively uneducated, in low wage jobs.'" The authors of one of the
studies theorize that, in low wage labor markets, where employers lack
other signaling information -such as education and prior experiencerelated to worker value, they rely heavily on marital status as an
indicator of worker value."'
The findings of wage discrimination against single people in labor
markets are limited to men. This is because it is not clear whether women
receive a marital wage premium to begin with.'" In fact, researchers have

1o2. See Chiodo & Owyang, supra note roo, io.
103. Kate Antonovics & Robert Town, Are All the Good Men Married? Uncovering the Sources of
the Marital Wage Premium, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 317, 317-19 (2004).
104. Id. at 317-20.
105. Id. at 320.

ro6. Id. ("Thus, the answer to the question posed in the title of our paper, appears to be 'no.' Not
all the good men are married.").
£07. See Zimmer, supra note rol; Esfandiar Maasoumi et al., Who Benefits from Marriage?, 71
& STAT. I, 29-3o (2oo9) (finding also that the marital wage premium is minimal

OXFORD BULL. EcoN.

or nonexistent for higher wage jobs).
io8. See Maasoumi et al., supra note 107, at 29.
1o9. There is far less research on marital wage effects for women, and the findings are more

David Neumark & Sanders
ambiguous. Some researchers have found evidence of premium. See, e.g.,
Korenman, Source of Bias in Women's Wage Equations: Results Using Sibling Data, 29 J. HUM.
REsouRCEs 379 (1994). Others have found a marital wage penalty-that married women are paid less
than single women. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 98, at 588. Still others have found no discernible premium
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found evidence of the opposite phenomenon, particularly with respect to
married women with children-the so-called motherhood wage
penalty."0 They theorize that married women may be paid less than their
single counterparts because married women are more closely tied to
children and household labor than married men."' Attempting to
measure the intersecting effects of marital status and gender on wages is
highly complex, and clearly more research is needed." 2 Nonetheless,
insofar as men's wages are concerned, there is credible evidence that
married men receive higher pay than single men merely because they are
married, and not because they are more productive.
2.
Psychologicaland Social Costs
Sociologists and psychologists have also begun to study negative
cultural portrayals and attitudes about single people."' They have found
that unmarried people are viewed as less likeable than married people,"4
and more shy, insecure, and inflexible."' Single people are described as
more selfish, immature, and less well adjusted than coupled people." 6
They are perceived to be more promiscuous and to have riskier
personality traits as compared to married people with identical profiles
of sexual behavior."' Middle-aged single people are seen as pathetic,
lonely, and hopeless in their quest for love." 8 In addition, middle-aged

or penalty. See, e.g., Samuel Giffin & Quinton White, Why Not Women Too? An Analysis of the
Effects of Women's MaritalStatus and Other Related Factors on Wages, ISSUES POL. ECON., Aug. 2008.
ilo. See Deborah J. Anderson et al., The Motherhood Wage Penalty Revisited: Experience,
Heterogeneity, Work Effort, and Work-Schedule Flexibility, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 273 (2oo3):

Michelle J. Budig & Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66 Am. Soc. REV. 204 (2ool):
Hill, supra note 98, at 588.
i ii.

See Hill, supra note 98, at 579-8I.

112. See Robert K. Toutkoushian et al., The Interaction Effects of Gender, Race, and MaritalStatus
on Faculty Salaries, 78 J. HIGHER EDUC. 572, 597 (2007) (noting the complex interaction of personal

and other characteristics that contribute to pay inequities, and the need for more research).
113. See generally Bella M. DePaulo & Wendy L. Morris, Singles in Society and in Science, T6
PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 57 (2005)

(examining the nature of, and possible explanations

for, negative

stereotypes about single people). But see James M. Puckett. Rethinking Tax Priorities: Marriage
Neutrality, Children, and Contemporary Families, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 20m0) (arguing for
elimination of the joint return, while providing support for parents and children).
114. See Joachim Krueger et al., Perceiving Middle-Aged Adults: Effects of Stereotype-Congruent
and Incongruent Information, 50 J. GERONTOLOGY 82, 92-93 (1995).

115. See Wendy L. Morris et al., Perceptions of People Who Are Single: A Developmental Life
Tasks Model, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MODERN PREJUDICE

165,

182 (Melanie A. Morrison & Todd G.

Morrison eds., 2008). They are also described as more sociable, fun, and independent than married
people. See id.
116. See Alan A. Davis & Philip M. Strong, Working Without a Net: The Bachelor as a Social
Problem, 25 Soc. REV. 109 (1977); Tobias Greitemeyer, Stereotypes of Singles: Are Singles What We
Think?, 39 EUROPEAN J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 368, 369 (2008); Morris et al., supra note 115, at II.
17. Terri D. Conley & Barry E. Collins, Gender, Relationship Status and Stereotyping About
Sexual Risk, 28 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.

BULL. 1483 (2002).

s 8. See Anne Byrne. Singular Identities: Managing Stigma, Resisting Voices,
REV. 13, 90-93 (2000); Krueger et al., supra note 114, at 15-22.
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single people are often assumed to be gay, lesbian, or bisexual, which
carries with it a whole additional set of biases and negative stereotypes."'
Negative attitudes like those relating to single people do not
necessarily impact behavior-in fact, most research indicates there is
only a weak link between attitudes and behavior."' Moreover, to the
extent these negative characterizations do have behavioral effects, on
either the single people themselves or those who interact with them,
these effects are difficult to ascertain because they relate to complex
interactions between people that involve subjective feelings and
perceptions. However, social scientists have studied stigma-where,
based on an attribute, a person is reduced "from a whole and usual
person to a tainted and discounted one'"'2'-and found both behavioral
changes and quality of life effects on those who are stigmatized. 22
Preliminary research indicates that single people feel stigmatized, and as
a result, they adopt certain strategic behaviors to manage their
stigmatization, as well as suffer emotional distress and low self esteem.'2 3
Researchers posit that those interacting with single people may
unintentionally ignore or exclude them, which gives rise to their feelings
of stigmatization.'24
Social scientists offer a number of explanations for why negative
stereotypes about single people have developed and why they continue
to persist despite the changing social landscape, in which many more
people are single for longer periods of their lives. These theories-which
can incorporate evolutionary, biological, religious, psychological,
economic, and political strands -almost inevitably turn to the question of
why marriage has been, and continues to be, so highly valued.' Of
course, a comprehensive account of this complex and contested question
is well beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, the Article will draw on

i 19. Tanya Koropeckyj-Cox, Commentary, Singles, Society, and Science: Sociological Perspectives,
16 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 91, 95 (2005).
120. See ALICE H. EAGLY & SHELLY CHAIKEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATrrTUDES 155-183 (1993). Most

of the research on negative attitudes towards single people uses quasi-experiments in which subjects
are asked their attitudes about fictional individuals whose characteristics are manipulated. Anne
Byrne & Deborah Carr, Commentary, Caught in the Cultural Lag: The Stigma of Singlehood, 16
PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 84, 85-86 (2005). Currently, there is only one experiment attempting to link negative

attitudes about single people directly to behavior. See Wendy L. Morris et al., No Shelter For Singles:
The Perceived Legitimacy of Marital Status Discrimination,io

GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL.

457, 460 (2oo7) (finding that subjects asked to act as landlords explicitly favored married couples over
singles in selecting tenants).
121. See ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 3 (1963).
122. See generally id.; THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF STIGMA (Todd F. Heatherton et al. eds., 2003).
123. See Byrne & Carr, supra note 120, at 86-89; Byrne, supra note I8, at 13-24.
124. See Kipling D. Williams & Steve A. Nida, Commentary, Obliviously Ostracizing Singles, '6

INQUIRY 127, 127 30 (2005).
125. See, e.g., Byrne & Carr, supra note
Koropeckyj-Cox, supra note 119, at 96.

PSYCHOL.

78;

120,

at 87-88; DePaulo and Morris, supra note 113, at 72-
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certain insights from the social science literature that are especially
helpful in reassessing the tax treatment of single people.
Particularly illuminating is the idea that there exists an "ideology of
marriage and family" that exalts marriage and nuclear family above all
other personal relationships, and that is so deeply ingrained in our
society that it goes unrecognized and unchallenged., 6 The experience of
romantic love and marriage is conceptualized as the attainment of a
transcendent state of bliss.' 27 Marriage is taken for granted as the norm
and the ideal, so much that few contest it or even recognize that it is an
institution of privilege.,8 Against this backdrop, it is easy to see how
negative attitudes about single people can flourish and how the concerns
and interests of single people can be overlooked or minimized." 9
Moreover, the ideology of marriage and family, along with negative
attitudes and assumptions about single people, can be unconsciously
imported into researchers' analyses and interpretation of information.'30
Social scientists-even those who are skeptical of the idea of "singles
studies"-have uniformly called for an increased awareness of the
ideology of marriage and family, and a willingness to interrogate and
challenge it.'3'
3. Toward a Positive Conception of Singlehood
Thus far, this Part has focused on negative aspects of life as a single
person-the negative attitudes and behaviors toward single people that
inflict economic, psychological, and social harms on them. Of equal
importance (and also more heartening) are recent efforts to articulate a
positive conception of singlehood.

126. See DePaulo & Morris, supra note 113, at 58, 77. DePaulo & Morris go so far to call it the
"cult of the couple." Id. at 75.
127. See Deborah Carr, Well-Being of Single Women, in WOMEN ON THEIR OwN 58, 62 (Rudolph
M. Bell & Virginia Yans eds., 2oo8); ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTIMACY:
SEXUALITY, LOVE, AND ERoTIcIsM IN MODERN SOCIEIES I11I-57 (1992).
128. See Byrne & Carr, supra note 120, at 88 ("[T]he privilege afforded to married persons is the

most pervasive and least contested of all privileges because nearly all persons have first-hand
experience with the nuclear family. Profamily attitudes are not only internalized by children and
young adults but also are reified on a daily basis through language and practice."); Anne Byrne, Single
Women in Ireland, in WOMEN ON THEIR OWN, supra note 127, at 6, 17 [hereinafter Byrne, Single
Women in Ireland]; see also Pierre Bourdieu, On Family as a Realized Category, 13 THEORY, CULTURE
& Soc. 19, 19-24 (1996); Trevor Purvis & Alan Hunt, Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology,
Discourse, Ideology, 44 BRrr. J. Soc. 473 (1993).
129. See Christian S. Crandall & Ruth H. Warner, Commentary, How a Prejudice is Recognized,
16 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 137, 138 (2005) ("The kind of prejudice toward singles.. . is so smoothly
integrated into the everyday ideology of Americans that most people will not notice their evaluations,
their beliefs, their assumptions, and their preferences."); Willlams & Nida, supra note 124, at 128
(analogizing the unconscious disregard of single people's interests to institutional discrimination).
130. See Carr, supra note 127, at 58-59; DePaulo & Morris, supra note 113, at 65-71131. See, e.g., Margaret S. Clark & Steven M. Graham, Do Relationship Researchers Neglect
Singles? Can We Do Better?, 16 PSYcHOL. INQUIRY I13I, 135 (2005); Kenneth L. Dion, MaritalStatus as
Stimulus Variable and Subject Variable, x6 PSYcHOL. INQUIRY 104, 11o (20o5).
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Feminist theorists have been at the forefront of these efforts,
perhaps to contest the especially negative portrayals of single women. As
Anne Byrne observes, the single woman's social identity has been
"variously constructed as an old maid, a spinster, an androgyne, a rebel, a
marriage resister, sad, mad, or bad, embittered, sexless, surplus, celibate,
virtuous, a menace, homosexual, a bachelor woman, or an independent
woman." 3 In her study of thirty single women born in the 1950s and
1960s, Byrne explores through firsthand narratives how these women
have navigated their uneasy identities as single women in a society
dominated by "(i) a patriarchal conception of womanhood as
heterosexual, married and reproductive, and (2) a conception of single
womanhood as lack, as deviant, and as a threat to the patriarchal
order."' 33 While Byrne finds much emotional and cognitive turmoil
among her subjects, she also discerns in many of them the self-awareness
and self-reflection that can lead to resistance and, ultimately, social
transformation.' 34 She perceives an emerging conception of the single
woman as "independent and self reliant, as exercising the capacity to
choose and to determine one's own life path."'35
The renewed focus of feminist theorists on single women seems also
to be prompted by the life experiences of a generation of women who
grew up with the optimism of liberal second-wave feminism, but who are
now realizing that they cannot, or do not want to, "have it all." In her
engaging account of the history of feminism in the United States and the
role of the single woman throughout, legal scholar Rachel Moran writes,
In sum, liberal second-wave feminists mainly have emphasized
economic independence. In doing so, they have enabled many women
to become financially self-sufficient and remain single. Despite new
possibilities for singlehood, activists have addressed women's intimate
lives mostly in conjunction with marriage and motherhood. A great
deal of attention has been paid to balancing work and family life, while
little effort has been made to forge strong alternative visions of life as a
single woman."'
2

132. BYRNE, Single Women in Ireland,supra note 128, at 39. Single men do not exactly have it easy,
either. They are stereotyped as "horny, slovenly, and irresponsible," or "fastidious, frivolous and gay."
DEPAULO, supra note 70, at 150.

133. BYRNE, Single Women in Ireland, supra note 128, at x9; see Jill Reynolds & Margaret
Wetherell, The Discursive Climate of Singleness: The Consequences for Women's Negotiation of a
Single Identity, 13 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 489, 489-510 (2003) (interview study of thirty British women
using discursive psychology to develop a feminist perspective on singleness).

134. BYRNE, Single Women in Ireland,supra note 128, at 34-35.
135. Id. at 37.

336. Rachel F. Moran, How Second-Wave Feminism Forgot the Single Woman, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV.
223, 282 (2004) [hereinafter Moran, Single Woman]; see also Angela P. Harris, Loving Before and
After the Law, 76 FORDHAM L. Ray. 2823, 2842-44 (2008); Rachel F. Moran, Loving and the Legacy of
Unintended Consequences, 2oo7 Wis. L. REV. 239, 274-76.
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Moran believes that "singlehood has arrived, with or without a
formal movement to recognize it."' 7 She and others, such as sociologist
E. Kay Trimberger, seek to sketch out a positive conception of
singlehood for women. Trimberger identifies six criteria for a fully
realized single life: (i) pursuing fulfilling work, (2) forging connections to
the next generation, (3) creating a home, (4) developing intimate
relationships with a network of friends and extended family, (5)
sustaining a community, and (6) accepting one's sexuality.' 8 Like Byrne,
Trimberger emphasizes autonomy and self-actualization in her positive
conception of the single woman. Trimberger further enriches this vision
by examining the lives of several single women over the course of many
years, providing a nuanced account of the process by which they forge a
positive identity over time:
We have seen that most women do not choose a single life; they do
not have a life plan for remaining single. Rather, the self-actualizing
choices they make over a lifetime gradually lead them toward a sense
of being a whole person with a unique identity. Thus, autonomy is not
a precondition but rather an outcome of the long drama of crafting a
satisfying single life. Women of many personality types-whether
divorced or ever single-become more autonomous through this
process.'"

IV.
A.

SINGLE PEOPLE AND THE JOINT RETURN

INSIGHTS AND A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Returning to the realm of tax law and the treatment of single people
under the joint return, of what significance is our changing demographic
landscape, and what insights can be drawn from the work of social
scientists and feminist theorists?
The mere fact of the demographic shift toward single people would
seem to occasion a timely opportunity to reexamine their treatment
under the tax system. At the very least, this shift highlights the increasing
obsolescence of the heterosexual married couple as the societal norm.
The time when a majority of households consisted of such couples (with
or without children)-and any concerns about the treatment of
nontraditional households could be more easily dismissed as affecting
only a small minority-would seem to have passed.
Obsolescence by itself, however, does not necessarily provide the
impetus for change. The norm of the single-earner heterosexual married
couple has been obsolete for quite some time, and the adverse impact of
joint return, particularly on women in dual-earner marriages, has been

137. Moran, Single Woman, supra note 136. at 284.
138. E. KAY TRIMBERGER, THE NEW SINGLE WOMAN 65-83 (2008).
'39. Id.at I 6-37 (footnote omitted).
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well documented, beginning with Grace Blumberg's pathbreaking 1971
article. 40 Nonetheless, the joint return has persisted. 4'
The research of behavioral scientists strengthens the case for
reevaluating the joint return by demonstrating the ways in which
continuing to privilege marriage and couples imposes real costseconomic, social, and psychological- on single people. Perhaps even
more importantly, social scientists call attention to the powerful
influence of the ideology of marriage and family, under which it is easy to
assume that the married couple is both the ideal and the norm, and to
overlook or minimize the costs to those who do not conform. They
further caution us to interrogate and challenge the methodologies and
assumptions of researchers, who are not immune to this influence.
Finally, feminist theorists provide us with a glimpse of the way forwardand encourage us to recognize and value, rather than deny and penalize,
the fully realized single person.
B.

DIRECTIONs NOT TAKEN

One possibility, not adopted here, would be to position singles
(possibly in combination with unmarried couples) as a distinct group that
deserves equal treatment with couples. This is the approach taken by
some of the organizations and commentators described above, who seek
to mobilize singles as a political force.' 42 With respect to taxes, their
message is simple: every marriage bonus has a corresponding singles
penalty.'43 There is precedent for this type of organizational effort. The
1969 tax reduction for single people was aggressively lobbied for by
various individuals and groups representing the interests of single
people."
This approach is problematic on two fronts. First, single people are
not a monolithic group, but rather a shifting and diverse constituency of
individuals, some male, some female, some never married, some
divorced, some widowed, some heterosexual, some gay, lesbian, or

£4o. Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Working
Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 95 (1971).

141. One might view the adverse effects on women in the workplace as a transitional issue that will
become less problematic as more women become primary earners, or we move away from the
primary/secondary model generally. See Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, Changes in the Labor
Supply Behavior of Married Women: ig8o-20oo,

25

J.

LAB.

EcoN. 393, 395-411

(2007)

(finding, for

both decades, a new, steady, and dramatic reduction in women's own wage labor supply elasticity, and
a continuing decline in their cross-wage elasticity). In this way, it is arguably a less serious problem
than the demographic shift toward singlehood, which there is no reason to think will be impermanent.
142. See supra notes 65, 66, 84.
143. See, e.g., Conlin, supra note 78; DEPAULo, supra note 7o; Shari Motro, Op-Ed., Single and
Paying for It, N.Y. TIMES, .Jan. 25, 2004, §4, at 15.
144. See Ventry, supra note II, at8;see also, Zelenak, supra note II, at37-39-
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transgender. This is recognized by sociologists,"' and reflected in the
sprawling rhetoric of singles' advocacy groups." 6 The notion that a group
of people share an important set of characteristics merely because they
all possess the legal status of being unmarried is untenable and
potentially offensive.' 47
Second, framing the issue in terms of winners and losers under the
tax system does not help to advance a better understanding of how we
ought to be taxing differently situated people. The former "losers" may
eventually gain enough in numbers and political organization to bring
about changes in law under which they become "winners." However, this
does not mean such changes are necessarily desirable from a policy
standpoint. Indeed, the joint return, with all of the thorny issues it has
engendered, resulted from just such a tyranny of the majority.
Rather, my approach is to reassess the joint return and its impacts
on single people through a more refined lens, with a willingness to
examine the flaws that lens reveals.
C.

SINGLE PEOPLE IN A JOINT RETURN WORLD

The Single Person'sPenalty
In examining the tax treatment of marriage, single people are
necessarily implicated, because marriage bonuses or penalties are, to
some extent, defined by reference to the relative tax burdens of married
and single people. However, in recent years, the treatment of single
people has been a tangential consideration only, as scholars and
policymakers have focused almost exclusively on the treatment of
married people.4 8 My goal here is to consider the issue from the
i.

145. See, e.g., Koropeckyj-Cox, supra note II9, at 93-95.

146. For example, The Alternatives to Marriage Project, whose explicit goal is to "advocate for the
equal rights of unmarried people," invites just about everyone to participate in their efforts: "The
Alternatives to Marriage Project is open to everyone, including singles, couples, married people,
people in relationships with more than two people, and people of all genders and sexual orientations.
We welcome our married supporters, who are among the many friends, relatives, and allies of
unmarried people." About The Alternatives to Marriage Project, http://www.unmarried.org/aboutus.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
Another organization, Unmarried America, bills itself on its home page as "a service
organization for the unmarried majority," and lists the following categories of constituents: solo,
roommate, partner, parent, family, never married, separated, divorced, widowed, straight, gay, bi,
asexual, democrat, republican, independent, employee, consumer, and voter. See Unmarried America,
http://www.unmarriedamerica.org (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
'47. See Elisabeth Eaves, Does the World Really Need a Magazine for Single People?, FORBES.COM,
Dec. 12, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/2oo8/I2/1i/single-magazine-marketing-oped-cx ee1I2I2eaves.html

("[TJhere is something wrong with the whole concept [of a magazine for single people].... I know
people who would smack me if I gave it to them.. . . This is not because there's something
embarrassing about being single. Itfs just that singleness doesn't imply a set of shared interests, so it
seems like a strange thing to cling to as an identity group.").
148. Two recent studies by economists, discussed in detail and critiqued below, do address the
treatment of single people. See infra notes 154-69 and accompanying text.
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reference point of the single person, rather than the married person.
Toward that end, Part I defined a new term to describe the tax on a
single person relative to a couple with an equal amount of income: the
single person's penalty. This section further explores and critiques the
only two studies to date that have attempted to quantify the single
person's penalty.
As described in Part I, the single person's penalty under our tax
system is substantial-estimated to range from $o to about $78oo per
single person in 2001, and in the aggregate, nearly $47 billion in 1996and certainly even more substantial today.'4 9 In addition, there is never a
single person's bonus-a single person never pays less tax than a married
couple with the same income.1o
2. Rationalizing the Single Person's Penalty
The most commonly articulated rationale for the single person's
penalty-developed around the time the penalty was reduced in 19 69 -is
grounded in an obvious distinction between a couple and a single person:
a couple is comprised of two individuals while a single person is just one
individual. The distinction is commonly framed in vertical equity, or
ability-to-pay terms: What are the appropriate relative tax burdens for a
two-person household versus a one-person household? Because two
people obviously have greater needs for support than one person, the
argument goes, the couple is less able to pay taxes than the single person,
and their tax burden should reflect that. In theory, the couple's tax
burden could take account of things like economies of scale (that is, the
couple would not need twice as much to live on as the single person
because the couple could share certain expenses like housing and buy
food in bulk), and the enrichment of greater amounts of imputed income
that at least some couples might enjoy (that is, a stay at home spouse
could cook, clean, run errands, and generally make life much more
pleasant for both members of the household).' Many scholars are
skeptical that these differences can, as a practical matter, be taken into
account in determining the relative tax burdens of married couples and
single people, and even more skeptical that the joint and single return
would be the best way to achieve this."' As an alternative, some have
proposed eliminating the joint return, with its wider tax brackets, and
simply allowing married couples a larger baseline amount of income
exempt from tax by providing a larger standard deduction and an extra
personal-exemption allowance."'
149. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
151. See Bittker, supra note 2. at 1422-25; Gann, supra note 49, at 28-35-

152. Supra note x51.
553. See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN,
LEADING

CASES

AND

CONCEPTS 258

FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:

(Found. Press 2005)

A LAW STUDENT's GUIDE TO

(1977).
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Despite the difficulties of calibrating the appropriate tax treatment
of couples and singles on an "ability-to-pay" basis, two recent studies
have attempted to do just this. Alm and his coauthors begin by
computing the single person's penalty in the manner described above,
and then use an "equivalency scale," calibrated by reference to poverty
thresholds for families of different sizes, to adjust the penalty to take
account of different living needs of a single person compared to a
couple.'54 Their equivalency scale assumes that a single person with
77.7% of a couple's income is as well off as the couple. Therefore, at
equal income levels, the single person is better off than the couple, and
should pay correspondingly more in tax. Accordingly, some portion of
the single's tax penalty is recharacterized as an appropriately higher tax
on a better-off taxpayer. The magnitude of the penalty is reduced, and at
certain income levels, actually switches to a bonus. 55
Adopting a similar approach, Jane and Jennifer Gravelle use an
equivalency scale based on poverty thresholds to determine the
appropriate relative tax burdens.156 Their study is more widely focused on
the tax treatment of families of varying sizes, but they do include the
treatment of single people in their analysis. Their equivalency scale
assumes a single person with about sixty-two percent of the income of a
couple is as well off as the couple.57 After adjusting the single person's
penalty using the equivalency scale, Gravelle and Gravelle find that it
persists at certain income levels, though, like Alm and his coauthors, they
find the penalty switches to a bonus at other income levels."'
3. A Challenge to Methodology and Assumptions
The rationales for the single person's penalty rest on the assumption
that a single person should pay more tax than a couple with the same
income because she is better off. Scholars have debated how much better
off the single person is -after taking into account economies of scale and
imputed income-and have expressed doubt about implementing a tax
system that would accurately reflect the single person's higher level of
154. See Alm et al., supra note 23, at 74-75. They also adjust their basic computations to take
account of differentials in poverty transfers at the low-income end of the spectrum. Because twoperson households receive a greater amount of these transfers than one-person households, all things
being equal, this has the effect of increasing the single person's penalty. See id. at 74, 77-78.
155. See id. at 79-80.
i56. Jane Gravelle & Jennifer Gravelle, Horizontal Equity and Family Tax Treatment: The Orphan
Child of Tax Policy, 59 NAT'L TAX J. 631, 631-649 (2oo6) [hereinafter Gravelle & Gravelle, Horizontal

Equity]. See generally Gravelle, supra note 22 (incorporating the methodology and the findings of
Gravelle and Gravelle).
157. See Gravelle & Gravelle, Horizontal Equity, supra note

156,

at 634-35 & tbl.iB (showing

reference income levels for single people at sixty-two percent of those for a married couple).
58. See id. at 636 tbl. PC (showing effective tax rates for, among others, childless married couples
and childless single people); see also Gravelle, supra note 22, at l7 ("[T]hese calculations suggest (i)
that singles are taxed more heavily than childless couples in the middle income ranges but less heavily
at very high and very low income levels . .)
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well being, but the fundamental assumption, for the most part, goes
unchallenged.'59
This Article challenges the fundamental assumption in two principal
ways. The first challenge involves a conceptualization of marriage as a
form of consumption. This idea has venerable roots: Henry Simons
proposed it in 1938, in connection with both marriage and children.'6 0
Under this conception of marriage, an individual's decision to marry, if it
entails the support of another person, is a personal choice, just as is the
decision to go on an expensive vacation every year, and that
consumption ought to be taxed.' 6 ' If instead, as occurs under the joint
return, the married person's tax is reduced to take account of the added
expense of supporting a spouse, the effect is to privilege one
consumption choice-the decision to marry-over others. By the same
token, the person who chooses other forms of consumption over
marriage-the vacationer in my example-is penalized for her choice.
By preferring marriage as a consumption choice over other forms of
consumption, the tax system perpetuates the ideology of marriage and
family. Whether consciously or unconsciously, scholars and researchers
who characterize the preference in the neutral, objective language of
"ability to pay" facilitate this. Gravelle and Gravelle at least raise the
possibility of marriage as consumption in their study.16 2 Disappointingly,
though, they reject it summarily because of the measurement difficulties
of using utility analysis, which a consumption theory of family and
children would entail."' Alm and his coauthors do not explicate any
159. But see Gann, supra note 49, at 25.
16o. See HENRY SIMONs, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 140 (1938). Simons has been described as
"perhaps the leading American tax theorist of the 2oth century." Lawrence Zelenak, Children and the
Income Tax, 49 TAX L. REV. 349, 359 (1994). The theory of children as consumption has received more
attention than that of marriage as consumption, and is more easily put aside, no doubt because of the
universally acknowledged social value of children. See generally id.; Donald B. Tobin, Investing in Our
Children:A Not So Radical Proposal,73 U. CIN. L. REV. 457 (2004).
161. See Bittker, supra note 2, at 1421 ("[T]he legal, emotional, and social burdens on marital
income are self-imposed, since they result from the voluntary decision of the parties to get
married. .. . [A] tax on income should take no more account of a marriage vow than of the taxpayer's
propensity to spend his or her income on vacations, hobbies or riotous living."); Gravelle, supra note
22, at II ("[T]he choice of a spouse could be seen as a consumption or investment choice, which
should not alter the tax paid by the individual, or the combined tax of the two spouses. In this case, the
individual should be the tax unit.").
Another theoretical basis for taxing individuals separately, regardless of marital status, is the
exchange model of marriage, which theorizes that individuals enter into marriage to engage in a
mutually beneficial exchange of economic and noneconomic resources and services. On this theory of
marriage, the joint return-with its implicit income splitting-has the effect of taxing the nonearning
spouse for the services he performs in exchange for his share of his spouse's income, and allowing the
earning a spouse to deduct her payments to her spouse for these services, a result that is both arbitrary
and inequitable. See generally Note, The Case for Mandatory Separate Filing by Married Persons, 91

L.J. 363 (1981).
x62. See Gravelle & Gravelle, Horizontal Equity, supra note x56, at 632.
163. See id.

YALE
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particular normative framework for their analysis. Rather, they simply
state that "it is obvious that a single household and a married household
with identical AGI [adjusted gross income] are not truly equals."64 With
this conclusory statement, they assume what they set out to prove: that
the single person's penalty is justifiable because it is not really a penalty.
Under a consumption theory of marriage, a single household and a
married household with identical income are equals, and the single
person's penalty is insupportable. 6 5
My second challenge to the assumption underlying the single
person's penalty is less radical than the first, marriage-as-consumption
challenge, in that it accepts, as a starting point, the ability-to-pay
perspective. However, it is more radical in that it proposes that a single
person is actually not better off than a married couple, after taking into
account the costs of being single. Thus, though a single person has fewer
living expenses than a couple with the same income, and is therefore
better off, he is worse off in many other ways. He (if he is a man) is paid
less for his work because he is single.-'6 He is charged a premium for
many consumer goods and services.'6 He is stigmatized and ostracized,
and subjected to a variety of negative attitudes and stereotypes.'16 If
anything, he is worse off than the married couple, and should not have to
suffer the added insult of paying a tax penalty. There are practical and
theoretical difficulties with such an expansive measure of well-being for
tax purposes, and with the idea of using the tax system to accomplish a
sort of Pigouvian intervention.' Still, it is a plausible challenge to the
single person's penalty, and I present it in the interest of completeness.
164. Alm et al., supra note, 23, at 74.
165. By this, I mean the single person's penalty is unsupportable on pure tax-policy grounds under
the consumption theory of marriage. There might be other social policy reasons to provide a
preference for married households, as even Henry Simons acknowledged. See SIMONs, supra note i6o,
at 14o; Bittker, supra note 2, at 1421.
166. See supra notes 93-I12 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes I13-31 and accompanying text.
169. A Pigouvian tax is imposed to regulate behavior by forcing one who creates external harms to
"internalize" the cost of those harms. See ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE EcoNoMics OF WELFARE 131-37
(3d ed. 1929). Pigouvian taxes are often discussed as a means of regulating environmental polluters.
See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 21-47
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1975). Taxes on cigarettes and fast food are also sometimes justified as
Pigouvian taxes that aim to align private interests with the social costs of such behaviors. See, e.g., W.
Kip Viscusi, The Governmental Composition of the Insurance Costs of Smoking, 42 J.L. & ECON. 575,
581-84 (1999) (cigarette taxes); Jeff Strnad, Conceptualizing the "Fat" Tax: The Role of Food Taxes in
Developed Countries, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1221, 1240-45 (2005) (taxes on junk food).
The literature on pollution taxes, cigarette tax, and junk food taxes illustrates the practical
difficulties of identifying and quantifying the social harms related to polluting, smoking, and
overeating. See, eg, Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 Nw. U. L. Ray. 675, 705
(2003) ("[Ejcological economists believe that such Pigouvian taxes are insufficient by themselves to

regulate society's environmental impact, primarily because the informational demands of such taxes
outstrip scientific knowledge of ecosystem dynamics and ethical agreement on proper valuation
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THE ILLUSORY COSTS OF ABOLISHING THE JOINT RETURN
If, as this Article has argued, the joint return unduly penalizes single

people, the clear solution would be to abolish the joint return. I want to
return to Bittker's framework to consider the potential costs of such a
move. Bittker put forth three "ideals": (i) equal tax treatment of equalincome couples (couples' equality); (2) progressivity; and (3) not
penalizing or rewarding marriage (marriage neutrality).' Taking as a
given some degree of progressivity, the Bittker framework dictates that
we are faced with an inevitable tradeoff of couples equality against
marriage neutrality, and that is exactly how the debate has unspooled.
The joint return has enabled couples' equality at the expense of
losing marriage neutrality-taxing married couples with equal incomes
equally has resulted in unmarried couples sometimes paying more or less
than such married couples, in effect encouraging or discouraging
marriage.' 7 ' The quest to restore marriage neutrality has pitted single
people against dual-income married couples, in a "battle of
'neutralities,"' as Edward McCaffery calls it. 72 Dual-income married
couples, comparing themselves to unmarried couples, argue for reducing
what they perceive to be an unfair penalty on marriage, but then,
reducing taxes on married couples increases what single people perceive
to be an unfair penalty on singlehood.'73 As described above, the costs to
both groups are real-both in the pocketbook sense of additional taxes
paid by members of these groups, and in the sense of the social costs
produced by these irrationalities in the tax system. 74 Single people are
taxed unduly heavily by reason of their status as single, and dual-income
married couples are taxed unduly heavily by reason of their status as
married.
In a world without a joint return, marriage neutrality would exist,
and no group of individuals -whether single or coupled-would be
penalized or rewarded by reason of their marital status. The Bittker
framework, however, predicts a steep cost of eliminating the joint return:
methods for environmental goods and services."); Stmad, supra, at 1325 ("[S]cientific uncertainty and
complexity may be a major obstacle to designing food taxes that make sense . . . .").
Similarly, in this context, calibrating the taxation of single and nonsingle people to take
account of economic, sociological, and psychological harms imposed on single people by others would
be extremely difficult to accomplish.
170. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
172. McCaffery, supra note 53, at 986.
173. See supra notes I I-19 and accompanying text.

174. The social costs to couples include the effect of taxes on decisions about whether and when to
marry, and decisions about whether and how much to work, particularly as to secondary earners. See
supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text; see also James Alm et al., The MarriagePenalty, 13 J. EcoN.
PERSPECTIVES 193, 199-201. The social costs to single people include the effect of taxes on decisions
whether to marry, and the perpetuation of negative attitudes and stereotypes about single people. See
supra notes 159-69 and accompanying text.
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couples inequality."' Married couples would all file individual returns
and compute their tax liability under a single rate structure. The
aggregate tax liability of each couple would, then, depend on each
individual spouse's tax liability, which would vary because of the
progressivity of the rate structure. As a result, married couples with the
same combined income would have different tax liabilities -couples
inequality-violating the fundamental principle of horizontal equity."
But equal-income married couples are "equals" only if one views
each couple as an essential unit, incapable of being reduced further to
the two individuals that make up each couple. I believe this assumption
of irreducibility is erroneous. Marriage does not transform two
individuals into a different sort of entity. I contend that the persistence of
our belief in couples equality results from the confluence of two powerful
ideas: horizontal equity and the ideology of marriage and family.
The ideology of marriage and family explains why a married couple
is viewed as an essential unit. Under this belief system, marriage is
valued above all other relationships, and is both the ideal and the norm.
The experience of marriage is constructed as the attainment of a state of
transcendent bliss. Marriage is, indeed, transformative-husband and
wife become one, never to be torn asunder."'
This ideology is so deeply entrenched in our culture that it is
difficult even to question this conception of the married couple, even in
the face of declining marriage rates, increasing divorce rates, and the rise
of alternative families."' In the tax context, this entrenchment is
reinforced through the invocation of horizontal equity, which further
conceals the ideology beneath its objective-sounding "likes should be
treated alike" fagade. Thomas Griffith provides a succinct and trenchant
indictment of horizontal equity:
Horizontal equity is, perhaps, the most widespread norm underlying
traditional tax policy analysis. It is also the least helpful....
Horizontal equity generally is defined as the principle that
"individuals who are in equal positions should bear an equal tax
burden." The problem is that all individuals are alike in some respects

175.

See Bittker, supra note 2, at 1395
176. See id. at 1396
177. See Kornhauser, supra note 56.
178. Between

1970 and 2005, the annual number of marriages per 1ooo women declined nearly

fifty percent. See NAT'L MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS 2007, at 16 (2007), http://
www.virginia.edu/marriageproject/pdfs/SOOU2oo7.pdf. The percentage of adults who are currently
married has declined significantly, from sixty-nine percent to fifty-six percent for men, and from sixtysix percent to fifty-three percent for women. See id. at I8. Meanwhile, the rate of unmarried cohabiting
couples grew nearly tenfold between 1960 and 1998, divorce rates more than quadrupled between 1970
and 1996, and between 1965 and 2002, the number of births outside of marriage rose from twelve
percent to thirty-three percent. See Chicagoland Marriage Resource Center, Marriage Statistics
(20o8), http://www.chicagolandmarriage.org/marriage.statistics.htm.
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and different in others. The principle of horizontal equity cannot
determine which differences justify different tax treatment. 7
Anthony Infanti, in his devastating critique of equity analysis, makes
a persuasive case for the "subtle, yet pernicious ways in which framing
our tax policy analyses in tax equity terms can shape the results of those
analyses." So According to Infanti, one of the several ways in which
horizontal equity does this is through what he calls a "sanitizing effect":
"Tax equity rids [the] debate of difficult discussions about race, ethnicity,
gender, sexual orientation, disability, and/or other forms of invidious
discrimination by forcing those discussions to be carried out in ostensibly
'neutral' economic terms."'
Stripped of the protective armor of horizontal equity and the
ideology of marriage and family, couples equality is a fictitious ideal. It is
time to give it up, by giving up the joint return.

E.

THE UNDERESTIMATED COSTS OF KEEPING THE JOINT RETURN

The joint return imposes unjustifiable penalties on single people
merely because they are single. Through the powerful economic and
signaling effects of the tax system, the choices of single people about how
to live their lives-the relationships they form, the ways in which they
find meaning and fulfillment in their lives -are deemed inferior to those
of "mainstream" couples. This sort of perpetuation of traditional social
ordering through the tax system has been documented by tax scholars in
other areas.' 8 The hope is that once revealed, the insidious effects of the
tax system can be eradicated.
In considering the adverse consequences to single people under the
joint return, it is particularly important to be aware of the negative
attitudes and stereotypes about single people that are documented
above. Otherwise, it is all too easy to dismiss their interests and concerns.
For example, Lawrence Zelenak, in explaining why most recent attention
focuses on the marriage penalty, rather than the single person's
penalty-even though in 1969 the interests of single people dominated-

writes:

179.

Griffith, supra note 47, at 1155-56 (footnote omitted) (quoting STANLEY S. SURREY ET AL.,

FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 46 (1986)).

18o. Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equiry, 55 BUFF. L. REV. I191, 1259 (2oo8).
18 1. Id. at 1209.
182. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 14o; Dorothy Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy,
1o7 COLUM. L. REV. 790 (20o7); Wendy Gerzog, The Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and
Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 301 (1995); Mary Louise Fellows, Wills & Trusts: "The
Kingdorn of the Fathers," Jo LAW & INEQ. J.137 (1991) (gender and the gift
and estate tax); Kahng,
supra note 2; Infanti, supra note 180; McCaffery, supra note 53; Leo P. Martinez & Jennifer M.
Martinez, The Internal Revenue Code and Latino Realities: A Critical Perspective (Mar. 30, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Hastings Law Journal).
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[T]he complainants in 1969 (and 1972) had available to them a unique
demographic argument that the victims of the singles penalty were
involuntarily single. Both then and now, the social norm seems to be
that people should be married most of their adult lives. Long-term
singles may be looked upon as misfits, so that if the tax system
penalizes those who choose to be single, most people may not mind, or
may even approve."'
There is no indication that Zelenak himself believes that "people
should be married most of their adult lives," or that long-term singles are
"misfits," but by articulating these views as universally held beliefs,
without any challenge or interrogation, he helps to perpetuate them. In
order to make any progress toward valuing and respecting the choice to
be single, such unexamined articulations of negative attitudes must be
challenged.
CONCLUSION

The joint return is unsupportable and should be abolished. The most
important perceived cost of eliminating the joint return turns out to be
illusory: the perceived "inequity" of taxing equal-income married
couples differently fades away once each married couple is deconstructed
into the two individuals who comprise it. At the same time, the joint
return penalizes single people, just as they are beginning to forge a
positive social identity. Eliminating the joint return will remove a serious
obstacle from their path forward to autonomy and self-realization.
Of course, there are other, real costs to eliminating the joint return:
married individuals will have to report income, deductions, and credits
separately, rather than aggregating them on a single return. This presents
administrative challenges that do not exist under the joint return.N It is
beyond the scope of this Article to explore fully the practical challenges
of abolishing the joint return and adopting separate filing for all
individuals. Nevertheless, I believe these challenges are surmountable.' 5
Beyond the joint return, questioning the orthodoxy of marriage has
many other implications for the tax system. In their article
recommending that marriage be abandoned as a tax determinant, mainly
to reduce complexity, Toni Robinson and Mary Moers Wenig describe

183. Zelenak, supra note ii, at 38; see also Ventry, supra note ii, at 8 (describing the individuals

and groups who lobbied for the 1969 tax reduction for single people as an "odd bunch").
184. See generally Stephanie Hunter McMahon, To Have and to Hold: Rethinking Marital
Property and Federal Tax Filing (Feb. 16, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Hastings
Law Journal) (discussing income shifting and other administrative problems under a separate return
regime, and arguing that these concerns played a central role in the decision to adopt the joint return).
185. For a discussion of the mechanics of implementing mandatory separate filing, see Gann, supra
note 49, at 5245; Zelenak, supra note 43,at 381-4o1; and Note. supra note s6i. But see McMahon,
supra note 184 (arguing for retention of joint return in part due to administrative concerns with
separate filing).
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literally hundreds of provisions of the tax law in which marital status is
implicated.'16 From the perspective of single people, eliminating marriage.
as a basis for preferential treatment under the tax law would not only
reduce complexity but would also achieve greater fairness.
Moving beyond the tax system, recognizing the value of singleness
can help us interrogate and critique the role of government and citizens
in promoting and supporting marriage. 188 For example, the same-sex
marriage debate might be informed by considerations of whether the
legal, economic, and social privileges of marriage ought to be expanded
further, or rather eliminated entirely.'" Similarly, we might further
question the role of the government in promoting marriage as a solution
to poverty, especially for African American women.' Instead, marriage
could come to be viewed as one among many alternatives. 9 '

186. See generally Robinson &Wenig, supra note ii.
187. For example, owner-occupied residential housing preferences, including the home mortgage
deduction, 26 U.S.C. § 163(h) (2oo6), and the exclusion from gain upon sale, id. § 121, provide double
the amount of tax benefits to married couples. The gift and estate marital deduction completely
exempts transfers between spouses from tax. See generally Bridget Crawford, One Flesh, Two
Taxpayers: A New Approach to Marriage and Wealth Transfer Taxes, 6 FLA. TAx REV. 757 (2004)
(proposing elimination of the marital deduction).
188. See Harris, supra note 136, at 2846 (observing that marriage is equated with citizenship
through certain types of market participation, in family relations, in civil society, and in politics).
189. See generally MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETmcs

OF QUEER LIFE (1999); Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality's Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361 (2005).
190. See generally Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring: Welfare Reform's Marriage
Cure as the Revival of Post-Bellurn Control, 93 CAL. L. REv. 1647 (2005).
191. See generally NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2oo7)-
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